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Attorney General v Mutuna and Others 
(Appeal No. 088/2012) [2013] ZMSC 38 1 
Muna Ndulo 
 
The Facts 
On the 30 April 2012, two High Court Judges, Judges Mutuna and 
Kajimanga, and one Supreme Court Judge, Judge Musonda, received a letter 
from then-President Michael Sata, suspending them from their duties. The 
letter informed the three judges that he, the President, had set up a tribunal 
pursuant to Article 98(5) of the Constitution, to inquire into the unspecified 
conduct of the three. The letter directed that the judges “cease acting” as 
judges until the Tribunal concluded its proceedings. On the same day, the 
President held a press conference, stating that he had received “credible 
complaints” against the three judges and had therefore decided to constitute 
a tribunal to investigate the complaints. 
 
Two judges, Mutuna and Kajimanga, filed an ex parte application for leave 
to apply for Judicial Review of the President’s decision. Ultimately, the 
applicants sought the quashing of the President’s decision, contending that 
the suspension had been made without recourse to Article 91 (2) of the 
Constitution of Zambia and the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act. Leave was 
granted. Following the successful application, Judge Philip Musonda 
applied to be joined to the proceedings. His application was granted. 
 
On 17 May 2012, the Attorney General took out summons to discharge the 
leave obtained by the Applicants, arguing that the President had acted 
within his constitutional powers, without procedural impropriety, and 
without unreasonableness. The Attorney General argued further that the 
Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act was subordinate to Article 98 of the 
Constitution on which the President relied, and could therefore not “be used 
to fetter the Republican President’s power under the Constitution.” 
 
The Trial Court did not discharge the leave, ruling that there were matters 
ripe for further investigation, including the question of whether Article 98 
should be read and understood in tandem with Article 91 and the Judicial 
                                                
1  This case was decided before the Constitutional Amendment of 2016. The 
provisions cited in this commentary are the pre-amendment Constitutional 
provisions.  
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(Code of Conduct) Act. The Attorney General appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  
 
The Holding 
Adopting the doctrine of Executive Supremacy, the Court held that in 
enacting Article 98, Parliament intended to make it “possible for the 
President as Head of State to deal with that exclusive class of adjudicators 
without recourse to the Judicial Complaints Authority.”  
 
Holding that Article 98 was “very clear” and “unambiguous”, the Court 
adopted a literal interpretative method, arguing that adopting any other 
approach would be to “amend” Article 98 through interpretation. Using a 
literal approach, the Court went on to hold that there was no constitutional 
provision to support an “interplay” between Article 98 on the one hand, and 
Article 91 and the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act on the other. In the 
Court’s view, these were “stand alone” provisions. The framers of the 
Constitution, so the Court argued, “never intended for the powers vested in 
the President to be diluted through the route of the Judicial (Code of 
Conduct) Act or through the Chief Justice.”  
 
Deciding on whether the President’s conduct was unreasonable, the Court 
uttered these words: 
 
Bearing in mind the authoritative position of His Excellency, it would 
be illogical and unreasonable to hold that he did not receive credible 
information as President for him to act as he did. He [the President] is 
the overall authority on everything. His sources are exclusive to the 
public domain and must be impeccable. [Emphasis ours]. 
 
Finally, on the question of natural justice for the three judges, the Court held 
that since the suspended judges would have the opportunity to be heard 
before the tribunal, the setting up of the tribunal did not violate “open 
justice principles”. 
 
Significance 
This commentary argues that the doctrine of “executive supremacy”, which 
the Zambian Supreme Court adopted in this case, has no place in a 
constitutional democracy. A jurisprudence of constitutionalism differs in 
fundamental respects from a jurisprudence of “executive supremacy”. The 
former is premised on the supremacy of the Constitution. Additionally, 
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constitutionalism is premised upon the separation of powers of the three 
arms of the government. The stability of the nation hinges on respect for the 
rule of law which is the cornerstone of the separation of powers principle. 
Fundamental to the separation of powers principle, is the unassailable 
independence of the judiciary. There must therefore be entrenched 
safeguards to ensure judicial independence, chief among which are proper 
standards that prevent the arbitrary and baseless removal of judicial officers.  
 
To allow the judiciary to perform its duties fearlessly and impartially, the 
Constitution grants the judiciary independence from the other two arms of 
government. Article 91 (2) states that: “the judges, magistrates and justices of 
the courts mentioned in clause (1) shall be independent, impartial and subject 
only to this Constitution and the law and shall conduct themselves in 
accordance with a code of conduct promulgated by Parliament.” Article 98 
provides for ways to remove a judge from office. It provides that a judge may 
be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his or 
her office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or for misconduct, 
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of that 
Article. The Article further provides that if the President considers that the 
question of removing a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court under 
Article 98 ought to be investigated, (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall 
consist of a Chairman and not less two other members who have held high 
judicial office; and (b) the Tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on 
the facts thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge 
ought to be removed from office under the Article.  
 
Articles 91 and 98 are without a doubt, interconnected. Article 91 provides 
the overall context within which provisions relating to the judiciary should 
be interpreted. It underscores judicial independence. Article 98 is not a 
conduit of executive influence over the judiciary and no interpretation that 
supports this is valid. The removal of judges from the bench on spurious 
grounds is the greatest threat to judicial independence. There is no 
assurance of a judge’s independence if he or she can easily be removed 
from office. Where judges can easily be removed, it would require fearless 
men and women of the strongest will and moral fibre to do justice where the 
interests of the reigning political party are at stake. To safeguard the 
independence of the judiciary granted in Article 91, Article 98 provides that 
a judge can be removed on only two grounds: (1) inability to discharge the 
functions of office or (2) misconduct. 
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International standards applicable to the preservation of the independence of 
the judiciary amply warn against the improper removal of judges from 
office. They insist that a judge who faces removal must be examined by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, and that the grounds of removal must be 
limited to the two cases mentioned above; inability to perform one’s 
functions, and misconduct. The Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act of 1999 
states in the clearest of terms that it was enacted to provide for the code of 
conduct for officers of the judicature pursuant to Article 91 of the 
Constitution. The trial judge was correct when she suggested that there is an 
interplay between articles 91(2) and the Judicial Code of Conduct on one 
hand, and articles 98(2) (3) and (5) on the other. The procedures set up 
under the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act were put in place to ensure that 
the process of removing judges established under Article 98 does not 
compromise judicial independence, and undermine the right to due process. 
The interplay ensures that the President cannot, without the approval of the 
Chief Justice, initiate the process to remove a judge from office. In this way, 
the judiciary overseas the removal process. The rationale of this approach is 
that the Chief Justice will advise the President only in those circumstances 
where it is reasonable and justifiable for an investigation to be conducted. 
Without this check, it is impossible to ensure that the President does not 
appoint a tribunal that he or she can manipulate to achieve a predetermined 
outcome. Additionally, the complaints procedures established under the 
Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act protect a judge’s due process rights by 
enabling the judge to defend himself or herself before a complaints hearing 
before a Tribunal is appointed. 
 
The argument that Article 98 provides the President unfettered power to 
check the judiciary as the majority opines is to say the least, unbelievable. 
That thinking completely undermines and offends the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. Further, by construing Article 98 as a stand-alone 
provision, the court ignores the fact that there is a context to Article 98. 
Neither the Constitution nor the procedures prescribe in the Judicial (Code 
of Conduct) Act could have contemplated that the position of a judge be as 
vulnerable as the majority would want us to believe. If the Constitution had 
wanted to vest this power in the complete discretion of the President, the 
Constitution could easily have used words to that effect. The Constitution 
does not say misconduct “in the opinion of the President.” It says rather, “If 
the President considers the question of removing a judge of the Supreme 
Court or of the High Court under this Article ought to be investigated.” That 
means there has to be an objective criteria on which the question is based 
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otherwise the President is acting arbitrarily. It is correct to say that the 
determination of whether a judge is unfit for office or is guilty of 
misconduct stipulated in Article 98 involves a value judgment. But it does 
not follow that this decision and evaluation lies within the sole and 
subjective preserve of the President. Value judgments are involved in 
virtually every decision any member of the Executive might make where 
objective requirements are stipulated. It is also true that there may be 
differences of opinion in relation to whether or not objective criteria have 
been established or are present. This does not mean that the decision 
becomes one of subjective determination, immune from objective scrutiny. 
 
The argument that the powers under Article 98 are investigative and not 
executive is disingenuous. Equity looks at substance rather than form. What 
remedy can there be for a judge if the Tribunal recommends dismissal? 
Should the judge wait until the Tribunal has concluded its work to institute 
judicial review of the President’s action to appoint a Tribunal? It is a 
betrayal of the sacred duty of doing justice entrusted to judges if the judges 
take such an obviously naive view of the law and declare executive action to 
be exempt from scrutiny by the courts. Our courts must regard themselves 
as courts of justice, not merely courts of law narrowly defined, especially 
where human freedom and dignity are concerned. In the words of former 
US President Andrew Jackson, “[a]ll the rights secured to the citizens under 
the Constitution are worth nothing, and a mere bubble, except guaranteed to 
them by an independent and virtuous Judiciary.” 
 
A judge should not, and cannot afford to subject himself or herself to a mere 
mechanical application of the law but must feel called upon to higher duties. 
In any event, in this particular case, it was unnecessary to decide whether 
the decision by the President constituted investigative or administrative 
action because even in terms of the former, rationality is a requirement for 
the validity of executive action under the principle of legality. The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee has said that the principle of legality and 
the rule of law are inherent in the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
also stressed that there exists an inseparable bond between the principle of 
legality, democratic institutions and the rule of law. 
 
The majority opinion held that the appropriate way to interpret Article 98 was 
through the method of the “literal rule of interpretation.” According to the 
majority, the literal rule requires the court to give the ordinary grammatical 
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meaning to provisions in constitutional texts. This approach is contrary to the 
view held by other courts elsewhere in the Commonwealth. It is also 
intellectually deficient and can lead to bizarre outcomes. Does the majority 
suggest that our Constitution does not subscribe to any values that it seeks to 
reflect and advance? In any event, Article 91 and Article 98 need 
interpretation. How for example, do you reconcile the independence of the 
judiciary with an easy process of removal of judges from the bench? How do 
you reconcile the doctrine of the separation of powers and removal of judges 
by a system initiated and controlled by the executive without any opportunity 
for scrutiny? Further, Article 98 states that a judge can be removed for 
“inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misconduct”. To an 
ordinary layman these may appear to be clear terms. But far from being clear, 
they are in fact nebulous. All these matters require reconciliation by the 
Supreme Court in ways that do not undermine the core purposes of the 
Constitution. In a Constitution there are some unambiguous provisions, for 
example, the number of members of Parliament that because of the clear and 
unambiguous meaning of the text, render these clear-cut provisions amenable 
to a literal interpretation and do not therefore require the application of a 
sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation to reach a sensible 
conclusion. On the other hand, there are provisions of the Constitution where 
the text itself is so abstract or ambiguous that analysis of the text and 
sometimes the history, the structure, purpose, and intent of the relevant 
provision is absolutely necessary. 
 
The purposeful approach to interpretation invites more active judicial 
intermediation and interpretation. In particular, it demands that judges 
interpreting a constitutional text not only consult the spirit of the law but also 
endeavour to harmonize the letter with the spirit. To do this, the judges must 
bring to their reasoning and decisions a clear understanding of the overarching 
values and philosophical foundations of a liberal democracy; of the social, 
economic, and political evaluation of their country; and of the historical 
antecedents and contemporary purposes of the particular provision in dispute. 
The values of democracy, transparency, accountability and good governance 
are particularly relevant in the interpretation of Article 91 and 98. 
 
The existence of an independent and impartial judiciary is at the heart of 
Articles 91 and 98. The two Articles attempt to ensure that the justice 
system is truly independent from other branches of the state. Different 
organs of the state have exclusive and specific responsibilities. By virtue of 
this separation, it is not permissible for any branch of power to interfere 
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with the sphere of the other. An interpretation of Article 98 that holds that 
the decision to institute a tribunal is a matter for the President’s subjective 
opinion alone and cannot be questioned by any court of law is not in 
keeping with the Constitution. An interpretation that requires the existence 
of objective jurisdictional facts before the appointment of a Tribunal is more 
consistent and in keeping with the constitutional guarantee of the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
The Supreme Court in its judgment exhibited excessive deference to the 
Executive. As a result, alarming statements were made by the majority, to 
wit, the President “is the overall authority on everything” and “his sources 
are exclusive to the public domain and must be impeccable.” The level of 
grovelling exhibited by the Court in this case is shocking. How can a Court 
possibly determine, without scrutiny, that a President’s sources of 
information are impeccable? Is the Court telling us that it has a secret 
method of finding this out? If it has, is that method legal and transparent? 
As Lord Denning warned, when the state defends its actions by pleading 
national interest and privileged information, it is the end of liberty, and in 
this case, the end of constitutionalism. 
 
